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Structured Abstract:  
Purpose: Clinical pathways are multidisciplinary care plans with essential care steps for 
patients with specific clinical problems. Clinical pathways were introduced in China in 2009 
to assure quality, reduce risks, increase efficiency in resource use and control costs. We 
present a Chinese public hospital case study where a clinical pathway pilot was undertaken 
where we evaluate two main outcomes: stay and hospitalization costs for a tertiary hospital 
from 2010 to 2012 using a mixed methods approach. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Data were drawn from hospital records and in-depth 
interviews with hospital staff in a Shanxi Province tertiary hospital, northern China. 
Findings: We found that the main objectives: to standardize treatment procedures by 
reducing stay and containing costs, were not fully achieved. Staff implementing clinical 
pathways clearly encountered several institutional barriers; i.e., managers did not see the pilot 
as a useful managerial instrument driven by revenue generation. Physicians, too, lacked 
incentive to follow the guidelines due to income concerns. 
Practical implications: We point to the daunting challenges brought about by perverse 
incentives embedded in the country’s health system. We argue that concerted efforts are 
needed to undertake difficult health policy reforms in China.  
Originality/value: We present the first empirical study in the English-language literature that 
examines China’s ongoing clinical pathway pilots from a micro perspective. We combine 
qualitative and quantitative methods and reveal the hospital-level dynamics in its 
implementation. 
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Introduction 
China’s deteriorating health system in the past three decades is well-known to the health 
policy research community. The laissez-faire policies adopted during the market transition 
detrimentally affected residents’ access to affordable care (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). 
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Several misaligned incentives created during the market reforms transformed a centrally-
planned health system that provided cost-effective care to one plagued by rapid cost inflation 
and heavy out-of-pocket burdens (Ma et al., 2008). In response to major public 
dissatisfaction, the Chinese government launched its national healthcare reform in 2009, 
vowing to overhaul the country’s ailing health system. One prominent ongoing initiative is 
the clinical pathway (CP) system, which is believed to be instrumental to both quality 
improvement and cost containment. Launched in December 2009 on a pilot basis, it is now 
implemented in 5,924 public hospitals, with more than 400 diseases included in the program. 
The government requires all Class III (tertiary) hospital and 80% Class II (secondary) 
hospital staff to participate in the CP program by 2015. More specialties and diseases are to 
be included (Ministry of Health, 2012).  
Clinical pathways (care pathways, integrated care pathways and care maps) are 
multidisciplinary care plans that detail essential care steps for patients with specific clinical 
problems (Rotter et al., 2010). Informed by evidence-based medicine, CPs identify 
appropriate clinical interventions, timeframes, milestones and expected outcomes for 
homogenous patient groups (Queensland Health Clinical Pathways Board, 2002). Since their 
first introduction in 1985 at the US New England Medical Center, CPs are mainly used as a 
framework for balancing costs and quality in response to escalating healthcare costs. Winning 
popularity in the past three decades, CPs became internationally accepted in almost all 
healthcare management models (Hindle and Yazbeck, 2005). For instance, more than 80% of  
staff in US hospitals use CPs for at least some interventions (Saint et al., 2003). 
By standardizing care provision, CPs improve care quality, reduce risks, increase 
efficiency and control costs (de Bleser et al., 2006). In particular, length of stay (LoS) and 
hospitalization costs are two main indicators used to assess CP program outcomes. Previous 
studies report a significant reduction in hip and knee arthroplasty LoS and for treating 
fractured neck of femur, asthma, atrial fibrillation pneumonia, chest pain, etc. In relation to 
decreasing LoS, costs were also substantially reduced after CPs were introduced (Choong et 
al., 2000; Dowsey et al., 1999; Feagan, 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2002). 
Meantime, CPs also produced positive effects on patient outcomes, measured by hospital 
readmission rate, complications, in-hospital mortality and other major indicators (Rotter at al., 
2010). Encouraged by the CP program’s remarkable performance elsewhere, the Chinese 
government see as a promising tool to contain the country’s rapid cost escalation while 
improving care quality.  
We present a Chinese public hospital case study where a CP pilot was undertaken. We 
evaluate two main outcomes: LoS and hospitalization costs for a tertiary hospital in northern 
China from 2010 to 2012 by using a mixed methods approach. Data were drawn from patient 
records and in-depth interviews with hospital staff.  CP success depends on traditional factors 
such as qualifications, competencies, program design and many institutional factors, 
especially incentives to shape physician prescribing behaviors. We investigate a less 
successful case in China, which demonstrates how a CP program was implemented in an 
environment not conducive to cost containment and demonstrates actual results. We point out 
the daunting challenges brought about by the perverse incentives embedded in the country’s 
health system for decades. It is argued that concerted efforts are needed to undertake difficult 
health policy reforms in China.  
   
China’s health policy reforms and the CP pilot  
China’s health system, which changed from an excellent model set up by the World Health 
Organization and the World Bank for developing countries, to one ranked at the bottom is 
dramatic and well-known. Before its market transition in the late 1970s, the Chinese health 
system was embedded in a large communist economy institutional framework under which a 
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three-tiered public system provided highly subsidized services (Gu, 2001). The public 
delivery system financed by basic health insurance schemes produced internationally revered 
outcomes and offered the world a model for providing basic but effective care at fairly low 
costs (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). The market transition, however, has dramatically 
undermined the old system’s economic and institutional foundation since the 1980s. After 
government revenues declined from 1980, the central government had to substantially limit 
its funding to the health sector; accounting for 50 to 60% of hospital income under the 
planned economy (Hsiao, 1995). Unable to finance public hospitals, the government instead 
allowed managers to generate income from user fees for financial survival, encouraged by an 
ill-designed fee schedule, which has created high-powered incentives for hospital staff to 
shift from cost-effective care to over-utilizing high-tech diagnostic tests and expensive 
pharmaceuticals, powerfully inflating the costs (Liu et al., 2000). Fully motivated to generate 
profits, most managers tied physician incomes to revenue generation, which added one more 
perverse incentive that favors profit-making while ignoring patient care (Liu and Mills, 
2003). Overusing high-tech tests and drugs over-prescribing are ubiquitous in Chinese 
hospitals run as profit-seeking entities (Yip and Hsiao, 2008) and it is estimated that 20 to 
30% of China’s total health expenditure is spent on unnecessary care (Zhong, 2001). 
Patient sovereignty was further affected by deteriorating financial protection 
mechanisms. Old insurance schemes have either been dismantled or weakened following 
structural changes in urban and rural economies (Gao et al., 2001). Citizens covered by 
health insurance schemes saw a steep drop in the 1990s and the early 2000s and 
simultaneously, out-of-pocket payments rose rapidly. Poor insurance coverage, coupled with 
misaligned supply side perverse incentives drastically transformed China’s healthcare 
landscape. Health expenditure is escalating at a double-digit rate while expensive access to 
care (kanbing nan) and medical impoverishment (kanbing gui) top public concerns and have 
sparked widespread public outrage. To safeguard social stability and build a professed 
harmonious society, the central government finally demonstrated an unprecedented political 
will and embarked on a holistic healthcare reform program in 2009. Through this landmark 
reform, the government vows to overhaul a deteriorating system and build a universal 
replacement by 2020. In particular, top on the reform agenda is containing skyrocketing cost 
and alleviate the vast public discontent about affordability (He, 2011). However, cost 
containment, as witnessed elsewhere, is a formidable task for health policy makers, 
compounded by highly concentrated numerous hard interests and the system’s path 
dependence.  
While the government understands that effective healthcare cost containment ultimately 
depends on systemic reforms that will take a much longer time to take effect, some 
intermediary measures are critically needed to ease the policy gridlock. The CP program is a 
prominent initiative. Since 2009, CPs have been executed as pilots, steered by the Ministry of 
Health (MoH).This program is expected to standardize care provision and thus improve 
service quality and pave the way for alternative payment methods, especially diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) (He, 2011). All public hospitals participating in the pilot are required 
to set up executive and assessment committees to facilitate implementation. The MoH issued 
both guidelines and work manuals, and hospital staff are asked to start with common diseases 
before expanding the list (MoH, 2013). The diseases to be selected should be common and 
simple ones less prone to complications.    
Figure 1 exhibits a pilot program CP flowchart. Deciding to enter a pathway or not is 
made by the initial diagnosis, operational need and special conditions. The medical team may 
choose not to enter a CP and opt instead for an ordinary treatment protocol. The major threat 
to a smooth pathway flow is variation; i.e., any major complication may make the pathway 
plan unable to deal with complicated conditions and thus clinical judgment is needed to 
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determine if the CP should be terminated or continued after modification. According to MoH 
staff, the average exit rate in all pilot hospitals is 9.7% while the completion rate is 84.2%, 
with the variation rate at 23.9%. Variations and misdiagnoses have been major reasons for 
exiting pathways (Zhao et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 1 here 
 
To understand the pilot program outcomes, the authors collected all empirical studies that 
evaluated clinical pathway implementation published after 2009. The authors accessed 
studies through major academic journal databases, namely the China Knowledge Resource 
Integrated Database (CNKI) and the Wanfang Data (Table I). The CP program has been tried 
with several major diseases. Most studies used a before-after or comparison group-control 
group design to examine CP effects. The inpatient sample sizes ranged from 60 to 2,881. All 
studies reported a marked reduction in LoS and inpatient costs. In the studies that breakdown 
expenditures, drug cost reduction was the most remarkable, suggesting the CP’s positive cost-
control effects. A nationwide assessment in CP pilot hospitals between 2010 and 2011 
indicated that 90% of patients with diseases that were included in the experiment experienced 
reduced LoS while the average costs dropped accordingly (Jiao et al., 2013). The medical 
quality and outcomes were maintained (Zhao et al., 2013).   
 
Table I here 
 
While previous studies built a picture about CP effect on health expenditures, there are two 
main weaknesses. First, it is unclear whether this particular initiative led to significant cost 
containment for patients. Assessing LoS and hospital costs in general have not been as strong 
as might be desired. Some studies offer descriptive analyses by looking at the average health 
expenditures or cost increases before and after CP implementation, but more rigorous 
methods, such as modeling individual-level data using multivariate regression analyses, are 
needed to isolate or control other factors that may have influenced health costs other than CPs. 
Second, the recent literature offers little micro-level insights into how CPs are implemented 
in Chinese hospitals where perverse hard incentives intertwine and how the implementation 
process affects the pilot outcomes. Studies found that cost containment reforms tend to 
encounter several opportunistic responses from related parties, especially providers and these 
behaviors in turn may distort reform outcomes (He and Qian, 2013; Yang and Wu, 2014). It 
is therefore crucial to understand hospital dynamics by unraveling the incentives involved in 
CP implementation.  
 
Methodology 
A mixed-methods approach was employed to investigate a Shanxi Province public hospital 
CP pilot. Located in northern China, Shanxi is in the central economic belt that falls into the 
middle socioeconomic development strata. Hospital A is located in Taiyuan City, the 
provincial capital. Founded in 1952, hospital A is a major medical institution providing a 
comprehensive service. It has 1,800 beds and staffed by more than 700 health professionals. 
Affiliated with the Shanxi Medical University, it is a major teaching hospital and designated 
major social health insurance scheme facility. In 2013, Hospital A had 31,500 inpatient 
admissions and 546,000 outpatient visits. To understand CP effects and its implementation, 
quantitative and qualitative methods were employed. We used patient-level data to analyze 
CP effects from 2010 (the year when the pilot started in this hospital) to 2012 (the year it was 
fully implemented). Twelve interviews - four in February 2013 and eight in March 2014 - 
were also conducted. Administrative staff and physicians were interviewed to understand the 
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implementation process and the hospital’s internal dynamics. Hospital A was chosen mainly 
because data were available. China’s sheer size and wide regional disparity make single case 
studies virtually impossible to be wholly representative. It is not our intention to generalize 
the findings to the whole country; instead, we attempt to provide a micro account about 
implementing difficult cost containment initiatives in China’s ongoing national healthcare 
reform and to explain the hospital-level dynamics against macro configuring incentives in the 
Chinese hospital system.  
 
Quantitative analysis 
Our quantitative data were collected from the hospital’s administrative archive with prior 
consent. Constrained by availability, we chose the control group-comparison group posttest-
only design to examine CP effect in Hospital A. All hospitalization records from 2010 to 
2012 were collected. The dataset contains key variables concerning inpatient stay, including 
LOS, diagnosis, clinical tests, procedures and category costs. Inpatient stays in the CP pilot 
and those patients not involved were grouped respectively and formed our sample (Table II).    
 
Table II here 
  
Our dependent variables are LoS, total, drug and examination costs, and costs per day. The 
LoS is the inpatient days a patient experiences; total costs are measured as the aggregated 
formal medical costs incurred during hospitalization; drug and examination costs are 
measured as aggregated costs per inpatient stay; and costs per day are measured by the total 
costs divided by LoS. Our model considered factors that may influence inpatient utilization 
and costs. As commonly suggested and used in the health economics literature, this included 
both need and non-need sample population variables (Hernandez-Quevedo and Rubio, 2009; 
Gravelle et al., 2006; Jones, 2007). For need variables, we controlled age and gender. For 
non-need factors, we controlled job and marital status, and year. We employed two main 
quantitative strategies. Descriptive analysis was used to detect the annual LoS changes, total, 
drug, examination costs and costs per day from 2010 to 2012. To compare and estimate the 
changes in the utilization and costs for inpatient care for both the CP and non-CP patients, 
pooled data from 2010 to 2012 were subjected to regression models commonly used in the 
health economics literature (Gravelle et al., 2006, Jones, 2007, O’Donnell et al., 2008). 
Regression analyses were conducted for CP and non-CP diagnoses, respectively, to detect 
annual utilization and cost changes, controlling for any individual characteristics. 
Specifically, the discrete non-negative count dependent variable: LOS, distribution demand 
particular estimators. The most basic approach is to assume a Poisson process to describe the 
probability of observing inpatient stay yi, conditional on explanatory variables, Xi (age, 
gender, job status and year):  
 
(1) !/)exp()|Pr( i
y
iiii yXy
i  
where exp () is the exponential function, yi! indicates yi fractional, and i is the conditional 
mean of the count and is usually specified as:  
 
(2)   )exp(|  iiii XXyE   
 
A Negative Binomial/Negbin estimation was also given in the analysis. The estimation 
maintains the Poisson process for Equation (1) but extends Equation (2) to include an error 
term, for which a (gamma) distribution was assumed. Finally, the health cost variables log 
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(i.e., drug, examination, total and costs per day), were modeled using the ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression as follows:  
 
(3) i
j
jiji XZ     
Where
jX is the explanatory need and non-need variables,  and   are the parameter vectors, 
and  is the residual. For all analyses, the Variance Inflation Factor computation was 
performed and the results indicated that multicollinearity was not a problem. Ramsy RESET 
tests were also performed and the results showed that the models had no specification 
problems. 
 
Qualitative analysis 
Two interview rounds were performed; the first in February 2013 - four semi-structured 
interviews. Informants included a hospital manager, a department head, a division chief and a 
frontline physician. The main reason for focusing on these staff was to ensure that the 
implementation process could be understood from different perspectives to provide a 
balanced and holistic account. The questions related to CP implementation processes and 
physician views on the program. The second interview round was conducted in March 2014. 
Eight interviewees included administrative staff and physicians. Efforts were made to verify 
the information collected in the first round while exploring new themes. The transcripts were 
checked immediately after each interview to resolve ambiguities. Transcribed data were 
coded thematically and analyzed to discover emerging patterns, trends and themes. Every 
informant gave verbal consent before and after the interview. The process was supplemented 
by a participant information sheet about the research aims, interviewee rights, including 
confidentiality and freedom to withdraw at any point.  
 
Empirical results 
Quantitative results 
We conducted a descriptive analysis on the changes in the utilization and costs for the 
conditions entering the CP from 2010 to 2012. We then employed various regression analyses, 
controlling for individual factors, to model the patterns in year-to-year changes regarding 
LoS and medical costs for CP and non-CP patients, respectively. Table III compares the 
utilization and costs annual changes for patients entering the CP program from 2010 to 2012. 
Six diseases, for which data were available, including coronary artery disease (CAD), 
Caesarean section, uterine fibroids, myocardial infarction, acute appendicitis and senile 
cataract were selected for the CP program. When the program had just been implemented 
(2010 to 2011), the average LoS was significantly less for CAD, uterine fibroids and senile 
cataract patients; from 2011 to 2012, the program’s second year, LoS had only decreased for 
CAD and Caesarean section. Medical costs decreased for myocardial infarction and acute 
appendicitis during the first year and most cost variables increased dramatically in the second 
year, which suggests the CP program’s limited impact in cost containment, especially in the 
second year. 
 
Table III here 
 
For diagnoses that did not enter the program, average LoS also decreased from 2010 to 2011. 
However, all cost variables experienced an increase from 2010 to 2011 and they continued to 
rise from 2011 to 2012 (Table IV). 
 
Table IV here 
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Table V shows the CP and non-CP patient regression analyses. Regarding LoS, holding all 
other factors constant, a significant decrease was observed from 2010 to 2011 for patients 
receiving CP treatments, but no significant trend was observed from 2011 to 2012. For 
patients receiving non-CP treatments, average LOS decreased by approximately 9% from 
2010 to 2011 and increased from 34.8% in 2011 to 37.5% in 2012. Total costs also increased 
by 18.4% from 2010 to 2012. Regression results confirmed the descriptive analysis that the 
program had a limited impact on controlling costs and such an impact weakened in the 
second year.  
 
Table V here 
 
Qualitative analysis 
The experimenting with CPs mandate was passed down the health system hierarchy, 
following MOH guidance in 2009. Hospital A, as a major tertiary hospital in the city, was, 
unsurprisingly, selected by the municipal health bureau for the pilot. In response to central 
guidelines, managers set up executive and assessment committees as required by the MOH to 
execute the pilot. Despite its participation, two main structural barriers were found to impede 
the implementation. The first, at the hospital level, was that were passively participating in 
the pilot program, giving reasons such as: “mainly because the government requires us to do 
so”. However, implementing CPs may harm hospital drug and service revenues, which are a 
main income as noted by a hospital manager: 
 
We understand that the program can contribute to standardizing care, but at the same 
time, CPs have imposed considerable restrictions on the use of drugs, tests and 
procedures. However, they are exactly the key sources of our income. Implementing 
CPs essentially means we are losing profits. Look, I have the salaries and bonuses of 
more than 2,000 employees to account for. I also have an ambitious plan of 
infrastructural expansion and equipment procurement which all need money. If I tell 
you that I follow the cost containment instructions faithfully, that would be cheating 
you. (Dr. N, Hospital manager) 
 
Although there were only a few diseases included in the pilot, they are all common and 
constitute mostly inpatient cases. To hospital managers preoccupied with holding the bottom-
line, reducing LOS and average inpatient costs virtually means losing income. Clinical 
departments are trapped in the same situation because most Chinese public hospital managers 
divide their revenue targets internally and the targets in practice are constraining (He and 
Qian, 2013). For those forced to do so, progress has been sluggish as the Hospital A 
department head explained: 
 
CPs are not a compatible component for the current healthcare system or for our 
hospital. In our hospital, every medical department has a revenue target (from selling 
drugs and providing medical services), so implementing CPs will have a negative 
impact on our department target because under CPs we do not have the same 
autonomy of prescribing. We are reluctant to implement CPs. (Dr. L, Department 
head) 
 
The second barrier is at the doctor level. Implementing CPs harmed hospital revenues and 
affected doctors’ bonuses, which are based on drugs and services prescribed. In Hospital A, 
the performance-based bonus accounts for around 70% of doctors’ incomes. As bonuses are 
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tied to physician performance in revenue generation, reducing costs means that their bonuses 
are affected. As one physician put it: “we are not motivated to do it and CPs are generally not 
well practiced in our hospital.” (Dr. C, Ophthalmologist). Physician reluctance is also 
explained by CPs standardizing clinical protocols; essentially imposing restrictions on their 
practices, especially in prescribing drugs and tests. It is widely known that Chinese 
physicians take drug commissions from pharmaceutical companies, which then forms a 
substantial proportion of their incomes. To increase revenues, some staff also offer test-
kickbacks to physicians whose profitable diagnostic tests, such as MRI and CT scanning lead 
to cash rewards. Compared to the situation before the CP program was implemented, 
physicians now have less discretion when prescribing, which in turn affects their incomes. A 
Hospital A physician remarked as follows:  
 
Implementing CPs also means being restricted in prescribing; this would affect my 
performance and also my salary. Performance evaluation is still based on service 
volume and revenue generation. My salary is not very high, and now it will be 
further affected by CPs. (Dr. Z, Gynecologist) 
 
Hospital managers are aware that physicians lack incentive to implement CPs, but in the 
meantime, they face the administrative pressure from the health bureau to undertake the pilot. 
Hospital A staff, in 2010, chose to offer frontline physicians a financial incentive (RMB50 
for each CP entry) to offset physician financial losses and seek their cooperation. The effect 
was immediate and remarkable. Physicians gained essential motivation to increase CP 
entries. Having found that the CP entry rates had been stabilized, hospital managers decided 
to withdraw the financial incentive in 2011. Unsurprisingly, physicians less actively enrolled 
CP cases, as noted: 
 
When there was an extra bonus with each enrollment, doctors were relatively 
supportive. When the financial incentive stopped, nobody was interested anymore. 
(Dr. W, Pediatrician) 
 
Doctors’ salaries are linked with how many drugs they prescribed and services they 
provided. When there is no monetary incentive any more, nobody is motivated to 
enroll patients in the programme. (Dr. Z, Obstetrician) 
 
 
Apparently, implementing CPs encountered challenges in Hospital A. The main problem was 
that cost containment conflicted with provider incentives. Hospital A managers relied heavily 
on revenues generated from drug prescription and services for financial survival, whereas 
CPs regulated drugs and services. These incentives were also translated to frontline doctors 
who were reluctant to undertake the pilot when their bonus incomes were affected. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Clinical pathways are document-based tools that provide a link between best available 
evidence and clinical practice. Our study demonstrated some compelling new evidence from 
CP program implementation in a northern China tertiary hospital. We found that the main 
objectives (standardizing treatment procedures by reducing LoS and containing costs) were 
not fully achieved. Furthermore, implementing CPs clearly encountered institutional barriers. 
The hospital managers did not see CPs as useful instruments and were still being driven by 
revenue generation. Physicians, too, lacked the full incentive to follow the guidelines due to 
income concerns. The high-powered incentives, especially revenue targets and bonuses, 
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largely offset CP potential effects in Hospital A. It was difficult to compare our findings with 
other studies, because previous research demonstrated heterogeneity in study design, methods 
and consequently results. A 2010 Cochrane review (27 studies and 11,398 participants) found 
a reduction in in-hospital complications and improved documentation associated with CPs, 
most studies in the review reported a decreased LoS and a reduction in the hospital costs after 
the CPs were introduced. Furthermore, considerable variation in the study design and settings 
also prevented pooling LoS and hospital costs (Rotter et al., 2010).  
A nationwide assessment in CP pilot hospitals between 2010 and 2011 indicated that 
90% of inpatients with the diseases experienced reduced LoS while the average costs dropped 
accordingly (Jiao et al., 2013), others found that the CPs had no or little effect on LOS and 
hospital costs; e.g., the Ji et al., (2005) case study in Zhejiang revealed that 30% of 
department heads in a pilot hospital refused to implement the CPs because it harmed hospital 
revenues. Our results also suggest that the CPs do not reduce LoS or contain hospital costs 
and that the pilot implementation encountered numerous structural barriers. We found that 
CP effectiveness was undermined by countervailing incentives that formed an institutional 
environment unconducive to cost containment efforts, such as CPs, which rely on well-
aligned incentives, especially scientific payment mechanisms. In China’s case, the current 
health system is still functioning as a FFS. To generate enough revenue, most hospital 
managers have established incentives to encourage prescribing and medical services beyond 
what is required (Yang and Wu, 2014). Doctor salaries are tightly bound to their individual 
medical department’s performance. The more revenue department staff generate, the larger 
the bonuses received by doctors.  
System-wide incentives, especially under-subsidized health providers who are over-
relying on providing medical care and drug sales to survive, have been identified as a 
fundamental cause for over-prescription, medical impoverishment and unaffordable access. 
The policy makers have to bear in mind that CPs alone will not be able to fully contain costs 
because hospital managers are not constrained to a hard budget. It is essential to change the 
provider payment incentives and this may require thorough hospital sector reform. If the FFS 
system seems impossible to change then it is important to consider strategies to alter the 
perverse incentive embedded in the FFS payment system. Prospective payment methods are 
suggested and have already been used to make providers bear the overprescribing financial 
risk and to provide incentives for providers to reduce inefficient services. Evidence has begun 
to emerge, pointing to positive effects from using prospective payment methods to regulate 
provider behaviours in China (Luo, 2011, Jiao et al., 2013). Lastly, the policy makers should 
also establish appropriate service-specific standards regarding services to be delivered, 
closely monitor provider performance and enforce those standards. 
When contemplating policy implications, we must also bear the study’s limitations in 
mind. Although we provided more refined descriptive and regression analyses to capture the 
association between CP program, LoS and hospital costs, the results can only be interpreted 
as correlation rather than causality. Determining a causal relationship between CPs, LoS and 
hospital costs is more complex and may require establishing a control group or using 
longitudinal data. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to examine other CP outcome 
indicators, such as service quality and patient outcomes. Another limitation is the study’s 
generalizability. Any generalization to a wider context should be cautious.  
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Table I: Stay and hospital costs from primary CP studies in China, published since 2009 
 
Study Province Facility Time Disease Sample Outcome 
LOS Total inpatient 
costs 
Drug costs Test costs Treatment 
costs 
Liu et al., 
2012 
Anhui Single 
hospital 
Oct 2008- 
Nov 2011 
Type 1 Diabetes 
Mellitus 
Before:22 10.69.7 938611330 34674974 18481767 14911535 
After:38 9.94.6 62844447 26412428 15101473 1402909 
Ma et al., 
2013 
Gansu Single 
hospital 
Jan 2008- 
Aug 2012 
23 diseases Before:1436 11.45.6 66683503 34952883 Not reported 
 After:1445 6.42.8 57983046 26432180 
Lang et al., 
2010 
Shanghai Single 
hospital 
Apr 2008- 
Apr 2009 
Intracranial 
aneurysms 
Before:45 18.14.7 88k23k Not reported 
 After:45 15.32.7 70k21k 
Deng et al., 
2013 
Not 
specified 
Five 
hospitals 
Mar 2011- 
Oct 2012 
Transient ischemic 
attack 
Comparison:225 13.24.7 105855161 44792210 Not reported 
 Treatment:202 9.94.3 92004624 38342280 
Wang et al., 
2013a 
Beijing Single 
hospital 
2005 & 2010 Knee replacement 2005:164 23.6 66422 7309 3673 16424 
2010:471 9.5 57862 4710 2967 9935 
 
 
 
 
 
Wu et al., 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Beijing 
 
 
 
 
 
Single 
hospital 
 
 
 
 
 
Jan 2010- 
Dec 2011 
Acute myocardial 
infarction 
Before:190 17.112.5 5815139381  
 
 
 
 
Not reported 
 
After:228 11.26.2 4987039211 
Acute heart failure Before:194 17.010.8 5815139381 
After:204 15.111.4 4987039211 
Community 
acquired pneumonia 
Before:296 18.27.8 3313435304 
After:362 15.77.5 2628424185 
Cerebral infarction Before:80 26.025.4 153487300 
After:140 20.513.8 128927719 
Hip replacement Before:33 29.115.7 4871120586 
After:58 23.710.0 3795514220 
Coronary artery 
bypass grafting 
Before:39 31.513.4 9478620955 
After:59 24.56.7 8528424185 
Zhang and 
Dong, 2014 
Henan Single 
hospital 
Unknown-
Jun 2011 
Capillary bronchitis Before:98 15.56.7 3099125 197899 Not reported 
 After:93 9.54.7 1679104 89777 
 
 
 
 
Chen et al., 
2013 
 
 
 
 
Jiangsu 
 
 
 
 
Single 
hospital 
 
 
 
 
Jun 2009- 
Dec 2010 
Inguinal hernia  Before:31 8.06.0 82445152 27372630  
 
 
Not reported 
 
After:31 6.03.0 70512168 16871626 
Cataract Before:51 5.03.0 65822369 718319 
After:49 5.01.0 65241883 198299 
Premature rupture 
of membranes 
Before:262 4.01.0 35511384 479796 
After:348 4.01.0 30271001 17275 
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Lower limb varices  Before:42 7.02.0 87711820 47251124 
After:23 7.01.0 87641686 42371058 
Vocal 
polyps/nodules 
Before:53 8.02.0 52891438 1954919 
After:43 7.03.0 68221142 2654972 
Li and  Fu, 
2014 
Hubei Single 
hospital 
Dec 2010- 
Dec 2012 
Cataract Comparison:200 10.20.1 4827132 120654 85024 Not 
reported 
 
Treatment:200 6.00.1 4401129 72023 70046 
 
 
Wang and 
Lin, 2012 
 
 
Zhejiang 
 
 
Single 
hospital 
 
 
Jan 2009- 
Jun 2011 
Acute appendicitis Comparison:79 6.76.0 54572504  
 
Not reported 
 
Treatment:186 5.94.0 62963063 
Nodular goiter Comparison:363 9.59.0 91982285 
Treatment:258 7.37.0 86132312 
Cataract Comparison:122 5.35.0 94297196 
Treatment:407 4.94.0 67152911 
Gao et al., 
2010 
Shandong Single 
hospital 
Jan 2009- 
Oct 2009 
Inguinal hernia  Comparison:80 6.50.7 4284674 Not reported 
 Treatment:80 2.30.6 2319439 
Wang and 
Gong, 2013 
Hubei Single 
hospital 
Jan 2010- 
Dec 2011 
Transient ischemic 
attack 
Before:60 10.64.0 39752932 Not reported 
 After:60 8.64.2 56083200 
 
 
Zeng et al., 
2013 
 
 
Guangdong 
 
 
Single 
hospital 
2008 & 2011 Vocal 
polyps/nodules 
Before: 273 5.41.5 5447454 1213297  
Not 
reported 
 
2819105 
After: 416 4.51.8 5324605 931261 2776313 
Multinodular goiter Before: 372 7.01.3 6712463 778313 3335384 
After: 821 6.31.7 69751138 626207 3446653 
Community 
acquired pneumonia 
Before: 334 9.94.2 64552785 29401419 Not 
reported After: 245 8.52.5 61042141 23721169 
 
Table II: CP and non-CP patient characteristics 
 
 CP Non-CP 
 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
N 293 622 424 9,943 15,812 11,626 
Age 57.43 57.32 58.93 54.45 54.99 55.77 
Male 66.89% 69.45% 58.73% 57.27% 59.91% 50.76% 
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Table III: CP utilization and costs by disease type (2010 to 2012) 
  
Disease types Year N LOS % 
change 
Total 
cost 
% 
change 
Drug 
cost 
% 
change 
Examination 
cost 
% 
change 
Cost per 
day 
% 
change 
 
Coronary artery 
disease   
  
2010 49 18.1
2 
  8,495.01   3,180.01   1,651.16   751.76   
2011 111 10.9
5 
-39.60% 7,875.39 -7.29% 3,465.03 8.96% 1,476.19 -10.60% 1,157.39 53.96% 
2012 87 9.41 -14.00% 8,788.19 11.59% 4,127.98 19.13% 1,778.21 20.46% 1,404.63 21.36% 
 
Caesarean 
  
  
2010 47 7.44   4,942.72   794.64   273.59   674.77   
2011 56 8.04 8.02% 5,269.92 6.62% 1,308.20 64.63% 381.51 39.45% 675.25 0.07% 
2012 35 7.23 -10.04% 5,422.15 2.89% 1,684.17 28.74% 438.17 14.85% 774.66 14.72% 
 
Uterine fibroids 
  
  
2010 34 12.9
1 
  5,791.91   1,524.63   418.50   561.07   
2011 93 11.3
2 
-12.31% 6,340.21 9.47% 1,540.92 1.07% 521.37 24.58% 641.30 14.30% 
2012 50 11.2
2 
-0.91% 7,786.74 22.82% 2,370.89 53.86% 730.78 40.17% 753.78 17.54% 
 
Myocardial 
infarction 
2010 32 8.56   13,095.36   3,412.28   2,624.16   1,877.41   
2011 80 8.89 3.80% 12,515.95 -4.42% 4,917.47 44.11% 2,568.84 -2.11% 1,700.17 -9.44% 
2012 57 10.0
5 
13.11% 16,139.60 28.95% 6,917.73 40.68% 2,915.45 13.49% 1,698.79 -0.08% 
 
Acute appendicitis  
2010 44 7.36   5,950.23   2,072.29   298.07   807.49   
2011 55 7.40 0.49% 5,502.74 -7.52% 2,555.99 23.34% 755.81 153.57% 759.35 -5.96% 
2012 41 7.39 -0.13% 6,787.15 23.34% 3,507.32 37.22% 1,090.45 44.28% 1,103.31 45.30% 
 
Senile cataract 
2010 65 7.78   4,876.16   787.70   668.55   699.90   
2011 184 7.52 -3.38% 4,933.61 1.18% 1,051.36 33.47% 713.02 6.65% 709.48 1.37% 
2012 117 8.59 14.20% 6,433.89 30.41% 1,891.72 79.93% 1,035.36 45.21% 826.62 16.51% 
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Table IV: Change of utilisation and costs from 2010 to 2012 (including diagnoses not entering CP programme) 
 
Year N LoS % 
change 
Total 
cost 
% 
change 
Drug cost % 
change 
Examination 
cost 
% 
change 
Cost 
per day 
% 
change 
2010 9,943 14.96  9,114.49  3,065.39  1,079.79  759.97  
2011 15,812 13.76 -0.08 9,585.36 0.05 45,49.46 0.48 1,485.98 0.38 911.48 0.20 
2012 11,626 14.75  0.07 11,595.53 0.21 5,845.46 0.28 1,791.89 0.21 1,006.78 0.10 
 
 
Table V: CP and non-CP patient regression results 
 
 CP Non-CP 
 LOS Total cost Drug cost Cost per day LOS Total cost Drug cost Cost per day 
 Poisson Negbin OLS OLS OLS Poisson Negbin OLS OLS OLS 
Age -0.0009 0.0009 .0229*** 0.0139 .0302*** .0285*** .0348*** .0498*** .0923*** .0151*** 
Age2 0.0001 0.0000 -.00018** -0.0002 -.00027*** -.00025*** -.0003*** -.00033*** -.0006*** -7.3e-05*** 
Gender -0.0071 0.0070 -.155*** -.363*** -.202*** -.33*** -.34*** -.205*** -.429*** -.0193** 
Marital 
Status 
.206* 0.1890 0.1920 0.3050 -0.1080 -.466*** -.541*** -.396*** -1.06*** 0.0243 
Job1 -0.0319 -0.0165 -0.1440 . -0.0839 -.372*** -.341*** -0.0284 -0.7930 .136* 
Job2 .151* 0.1530 -0.0416 0.3180 -0.1500 .0643*** .0762*** -0.0145 -1.0100 -0.0050 
2011 -.143*** -.137** -0.0319 -0.1270 0.0588 -.0933*** -.0923*** 0.0139 .0735*** .0907*** 
2012 0.0160 0.0076 0.2110 0.4750 0.1480 .376*** .348*** .184** 0.0923 0.1030 
Constant 1.85*** 1.81*** 7.97*** 6.76*** 6.22*** 2.57*** 2.44*** 7.68*** 6.89*** 5.84*** 
 -15.1500 -8.6000 -38.8700 -11.7400 -32.8400 -201.9100 -62.6100 -204.1200 -7.9300 -177.6500 
           
lnalpha 
Constant 
 -1.36***     -.628***    
N 1338.00 1338.00 1338.00 1338.00 1338.00 37347.00 37347.00 37347.00 37347.00 37347.00 
ll -5025.00 -4067.00 -1236.00 -1995.00 -1129.00 -290000.00 -130000.00 -42410.00 -55477.00 -37328.00 
r2_p 0.02 0.01    0.04 0.01    
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chi2 195.00 53.90    22347.00 2672.00    
r2   0.05 0.04 0.08   0.16 0.20 0.06 
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Figure 1: CPs in Chinese public hospitals (Adapted from Wang et al., (2013b) 
 
 
 
